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Abstract
Following a phase of near-constant living standards lasting from Stone Age until
the onset of the Industrial Revolution, a large number of countries have experienced
growth takeoffs, in which stagnation gives way to sustained economic growth. What
causes some countries to enter a growth takeoff, while others remain poor? We dis-
cuss three mechanisms that can trigger a growth takeoff in a country previously cap-
tured in a poverty trap: fertility decline, structural change, and accelerating techno-
logical progress.
Growth takeoffs
Viewed on a historical time scale, economic growth in the world economy is character-
ized by a long phase of stagnation in living standards, followed in many, but not all
countries by a growth takeoff, i.e., a transition to steady and sustained economic growth.
Figure1illustratesthebasicfacts. Before1800, GDP percapitawaslow andnear-constant
in all world regions, with little cross-country variation in income levels. The ﬁrst coun-
try to experience a growth takeoff was Britain with the start of the Industrial Revolution,
closely followed by other WesternEuropean countries and the “Western Offshoots” such
as the United States. More recently, a number of Asian and Latin American countries
have undergone a transition to rapid economic growth as well. In much of Africa, how-
ever, income per capita continues to stagnate. What causes some countries to enter a
growth takeoff, while others remain poor?
Explaining stagnation
Before one can account for a growth takeoff after a phase of stagnation, it is essential
to understand why economies stagnated in the ﬁrst place. The explanation suggested
by one of the earliest writers on the subject, British economist Thomas Malthus in his
“Essay on the Principle of Population” of 1798, is widely accepted to the present day.
TheMalthusian model relies ontwokeyingredients: an agricultural productionfunction
that usesthe ﬁxed factor land, and an income-population feedback wherethe population
growth rate is an increasing function of income per capita.






















































Western Europe Western Offshoots Asia Africa Latin America
Figure 1: The evolution of income per capita across world regions, years 0–2001 (Source:
Maddison 2003, Table 8c. The “Western Offshoots” are deﬁned as the U.S., Canada, Aus-
tralia, and Nea Zealand. “Asia” excludes Japan.)
where Yt denotes output in period t, At is productivity, Nt is the size of the population,
and Z is the ﬁxed amount of land.1 In what follows, we will use lower-case letters to
denote per capita variables (yt = Yt/Nt etc.), and the growth rate of a variable x will be
written as γ(x). Output per capita is given by yt = Atz1−α
t , so that its growth rate γ(yt)
satisﬁes:
γ(yt)=γ(At)+( 1− α)γ(zt).
Since land Z is constant,wehave γ(zt)=γ(Z)−γ(Nt)=−γ(Nt). Usingthis relationship,
the growth equation can be rewritten as
γ(yt)=γ(At) − (1 − α)γ(Nt). (2)
Growth in income per capita is thus an increasing function of productivity growth and
a decreasing function of population growth. The negative effect of population growth
reﬂects that land is a ﬁxed factor: when the size of the population increases, there is less
1The results outlined below can be generalized to the case where physical capital also enters production.
2land for each person to work with, which lowers income per capita.
To turn the growth equation (2) into a theory of stagnation, one needs to specify how
productivity At and population Nt evolve over time. Assume for now that productivity
growth is constant, γ(At)=¯ γA. The main assumption underlying the Malthusian theory
of stagnation is that population growth is an increasing function of income per capita yt:
γ(Nt)=f(yt), (3)
where f (yt) > 0. A number of different justiﬁcations can be given for this relationship.
One possibility is that children enter the utility function of parents as normal goods. A
rise in income would then increase the demand for children, leading to higher popula-
tion growth. Alternatively, the mechanism could also work through mortality. If higher
income leads to better nutrition and, as a consequence, lower mortality rates, a positive
relationship between income per capita and population growth follows. As an empirical
matter, the assumption of a positive relationship appears to ﬁt the experience of most
pre-industrial economies rather well.
Using (3), the growth equation (2) reads:
γ(yt)=¯ γA − (1 − α)f(yt). (4)
According to this equation, the growth rate of income per capita is a decreasing function
of its level. If the detrimental effect of population growth is sufﬁciently strong, this mech-
anism leads to stagnation as the only possible long-run outcome. In a country where
income per capita is initially rising, population growth will accelerate until it fully off-
sets productivity growth, (1 − α)f(yt)=¯ γA, resulting in stagnation.
The Malthusian model is remarkably successful in terms of explaining economic growth
(or the lack thereof) until Industrial Revolution. However, we now know that ultimately
many countries managed to escape from the Malthusian trap. In these countries, living
standards today are far superior to what almost any human alive before 1800 could have
experienced. How can this drastic change in the economic fate of countries be explained?
Endogenous population growth
Given the growth equation (4), one scenario that could lead to a growth takeoff is a
reversal of the income-population feedback. If the positive relationship described by













































Western Europe Asia Africa
Figure 2: The evolution of population growth across world regions, years 1600–2001
(Source: Maddison 2003, Table 8a. “Asia” excludes Japan.)
growth will ensue. Consider, for example, the case where population growth ceases
altogether, γ(Nt)=0 . According to equation (2), growth in output per capita is then
equal to productivity growth. Thus, as long as productivity keeps increasing, income
per capita will grow indeﬁnitely.
Historically, the Malthusian relationship between income and population growth did
indeed break down in every single country that experienced a growth takeoff. In a pat-
tern known as the demographic transition, the high fertility and mortality rates of the pre-
industrial era gave way to a new regime in which fertility, mortality, and population
growth are low. In modern data, the relationship between income per capita and popu-
lation growth is negative (both in a cross section of countries and in the time series for
most rich countries), which is the opposite of what the Malthusian model assumes.
Figure 2 illustrates thedemographictransitionby comparing populationgrowthin West-
ern Europe(theﬁrst region toexperiencea takeoff) with Asia and Africa (the regionsthat
stagnated the longest). In Western Europe, population growth reached a peak at the end
of the nineteenth century and has been declining since, despite rapid growth in income
per capita. In Asia and Africa, in contrast, population growthaccelerated throughoutthe
4last 150 years, and is now much higher than in Western Europe.
A number of authors have developed theories that integrate models of economic growth
and the demographic transition to explain growth takeoffs. In this literature, fertility
decline is usually interpreted as a substitution of child “quantity” (a large number of
children) by child “quality” (fewer children in which parents invest in terms of educa-
tion or human capital). As an example of a model capturing this tradeoff, consider the
decision problem of a parent with preferences
u(c,n,h)=( 1− β)log(c)+β [log(n)+γlog(h)]
over consumptionc, the number of children n, and the children’s human capital h,w h e r e
β>0 and 0 <γ<1. The parent has to spend fraction φ of its time to raise each child,
and can choosetospendan additional per-child fraction e on educating the children. The
total child-rearing time is then given by (φ+e)n, and the budgetconstraint for the parent
is c =( 1−(φ+e)n)wH,w h e r eH is the parent’s human capital, w is the wage per unit of
human capital, and the time endowment is normalized to one. A child’s human capital
depends on the parent’s human capital H and education time e:
h =1+µHe,
where µ is the productivity of the education technology. Notice that a child receives at
least one unit of human capital even if education e equals zero, which represents basic
productive skills (such as physical strength) that do not rely on education. Lastly, the
parent also has to observe a subsistence consumption constraint, c ≥ ¯ c,w h e r e¯ c is the
minimum amount of consumption required for survival.
In this model, the relationship between income and fertility depends on whether the
optimal choices for education and consumption are at a corner. Assume that, initially,
the wage w and the education productivity µ are so low that the subsistence constraint
is binding and the parent chooses zero education (e =0 ). The number of children is then










Inthis regime, therelationship betweenincome wH and fertilityn is positive, as assumed
by the Malthusian model.
The outcome changes substantially if, through an increase in the wage w and the educa-
5tion productivity µ, the economy enters a regime where the subsistence constraint is no
longer binding, and education is positive: e>0. In this regime, parents spend a ﬁxed
fraction of their time on child rearing. The balance between child quality and quantity














Equation (5) captures the tradeoff between child quality and quantity: the number of
children is a decreasing function of education e. Intuitively, investing a lot in each child
renders children expensive, which reduces demand. Education e, in turn, depends pos-
itively on parental human capital H. An increase in income per capita (through a rise in
H) therefore lowers fertility n, the opposite of the Malthusian assumption.
Given these results, an escape from the Malthusian trap is possible if some change in the
economy generates increased investment in child quality. The literature proposes differ-
ent candidates for the underlying cause of such an event. In Galor and Weil (2000), the
takeoff is ultimately a consequence of technological progress. Accelerating productivity
growth increases the return to education (the parameter µ in the model outlined above),
whicheventuallytriggersthequantity-qualitysubstitutionand thegrowthtakeoff. Galor
and Moav (2002), in contrast, suggest that evolving parental preferences (through an in-
crease in the parameter γ) are the driving force behind fertility decline. Yet other authors
have emphasized the role of declining mortality rates (Boucekkine et. al. 2002, Cervellati
and Sunde2005, Doepke2005, Kalemli-Oczan 2002, Lagerl¨ of2003a, Soares2004), increas-
ing female labor-force participation (Galor and Weil 1996, Lagerl¨ of 2003b), changes in the
provision of old-age security (Boldrin and Jones 2002), changes in child-labor and edu-
cation laws (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005), and the introduction skill-intensive production
technologies that raise the return to education (Doepke 2004).
Structural change
Apart from endogenous population growth, the Malthusian model also relies on the
presence of the ﬁxed factor land to generate stagnation. A second potential trigger
for a growth takeoff is therefore structural change that decreases the role of land. In
pre-industrial economies, agriculture was the main mode of production. In contrast,
in modern industrial economies the share of agriculture in output is small, and conse-
6quently land is less important. Translated into the growth equation (4), structural change
amounts to a shift in the parameter α. In particular, an increase in α lowers the detrimen-
tal effect of population growth on income per capita. In the limit case of α =1 ,i n c o m e
percapita isindependentof thesizeorgrowthrateofthepopulation,andissolelydriven
by productivity growth.
In Hansen and Prescott (2002), a decline of the role of land is generated endogenously in
an environment where two competing technologies can be used for production.2 In ad-







t is industrial output, AI
t is productivity, and NI
t is the amount of labor em-
ployed in the industrial sector. Productivity AI
t is assumed to grow at a constant rate.
The total amount of labor is allocated optimally betweenthe traditional sectorand the in-
dustrial sector. Given thelinear productiontechnology,outputperworkerin themodern
sector is given by AI
t. Early in development, when AI
t is still low, it is optimal to allocate
all workers to the traditional sector. During this phase the economy behaves just like
a Malthusian economy where the modern technology does not exist at all. Ultimately,
however, the modern technology becomes sufﬁciently productive to be introduced. If
wM is the (constant) marginal product of a worker in the Malthusian regime, the tech-
nology will be introduced once AI
t >w M. From this point on, population growth no
longer affects output per worker, since land is not used in the industrial sector. Output
per worker therefore starts to grow at the rate of technological progress. Viewed through
the lens of the Hansen-Prescott model, what initially appears as a structural break in
economic history is merely the outcome of an optimal sectoral allocation decision in an
otherwise stable economic environment.
Endogenous technological progress
Starting once again from the growth equation (4), a third potential trigger for a growth
takeoff is a sustained increase in productivity growth that is large enough to “outrun”
population growth. Clearly, population growth cannot increase indeﬁnitely, as there are
physiological constraints on child bearing. Let ¯ γN be an upper bound for population
growth that cannot be exceeded for biological reasons. If now productivity growth satis-
2Related contributions include Matsuyama (1992), Laitner (2000), K¨ ogel and Prskawetz (2001), Gollin et.
al. (2002), and Ngai (2004).
7ﬁes
γA > (1 − α)¯ γN,
even at maximum population growth the detrimental effect of increasing population
density does not sufﬁce to negate productivity improvements, and improving living
standards ensue.
A potential cause for accelerating productivity growth is scale effects in the production
of ideas. An increase in world population implies that there are more people who might
invent new, productive technologies. An increase in world population should therefore
imply an acceleration of productivity growth. Scale effects of this kind underlie the take-
off models of Kremer (1993), Jones (2001), and Tamura (2002).
Conclusions
The three potential triggers for a growth takeoff presented here should not be regarded
as mutually exclusive alternatives, but rather as complementary explanations for a joint
phenomenon. From an empirical perspective, there is little doubt that all three expla-
nations are relevant: every country that underwent a growth takeoff also experienced a
demographic transition, a sectoral shift from agriculture to industry and services, an an
acceleration of productivity growth. Reﬂecting these observations, many papers in the
literature already incorporate more than one of the mechanisms. For example, a number
of authors propose models where accelerating endogenous productivity growth triggers
a fertility transition. This is true, for example, for the seminal paper of Galor and Weil
(2000) and, in a framework driven by human-capital externalities, for de la Croix and
Doepke (2003). Similarly, Greenwood and Seshadri (2002) and Doepke (2004) integrate
models of structural change with theories of fertility decline.
Building on the different mechanisms behind growth takeoffs that have been proposed
in recent years, a major challenge for future research is to understandwhy in many coun-
tries these mechanisms fail to work to the present day. Conceivably, a better understand-
ing of the mechanisms that allowed some countries to overcome economic stagnation
200 years ago might help us learn how the same feat could be accomplished in poverty-
stricken developing countries today.
Matthias Doepke
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